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Old and New Alliances: Christian churches and the African 
National Congress in South Africa. 
 
1. Introduction  
At the conference organised by the Programme to Combat Racism (PCR) of the World 
Council of Churches in Lusaka in May 1987 (4-8 May), the then president in exile of the 
African National Congress (ANC), Oliver Tambo, acknowledged the long history of 
partnership between churches and the ANC, at that time a liberation movement and not yet a 
political party, and called religious actors in the country to play an even more active role in 
the final stages of the joint struggle against Apartheid:  
The African National Congress has a long history of association with the Church. Our 
founders were churchmen and women. Throughout our 75 years [from 1912 to 1987] 
that link has never been broken. As we enter the final stages of our struggle, we 
believe that you, too, have a responsibility to contribute to the maximum to remove a 
regime which offends the very principles on which the Church itself was founded 
(Oliver Tambo, 1987, Lusaka in SAHO online A).  
While at its inception the ANC was, as Stephen Ellis put it, ‘a rather genteel organisation’ 
composed of middle class black South African mostly educated in religious schools or 
religious leaders themselves (Ellis, 1991: 439); the relationship between religion and the 
ANC was almost completely forgotten or strategically swept away by the dominant public 
media coverage at the time of the 1987 WCC conference in Lusaka. Indeed, those were the 
years in which armed opposition and violent strategies intensified in South Africa and in 
which the Cold War was used to frame politics and public action. Therefore, the South 
African Church (with the exception of the Dutch Reformed Church that maintained its 
support to the regime of Pretoria), which had had publicly supported the liberation struggle 
led by the ANC and the civil society umbrella of the United Democratic Front (UDF) since 
the 1970s, was accused by various voices - the Apartheid regime in primis - of collaborating 
with a liberation movement that was allied to the Communist Party (SACP) and colluded 
with the Soviet Union which persecuted churches and encouraged others to do so in 
neighbouring African countries (see for example in independent Angola and Mozambique 
from 1975. Helgesson 1994; Blanes & Paxe, 2015; Morier-Genoud 1996). In the polarized 
climate of the time, the African National Congress was, nationally and internationally,1 
 2 
depicted as a secular anti-religious organisation that aimed to eradicate any form of religious 
presence if successful in its political struggle against the National Party (NP) regime. The fact 
that the ANC consistently pledged allegiance to the founding principles of the Freedom 
Charter (the precursor of the current democratic Constitution) that stated that the struggle 
aimed to build a ‘democratic state, based on the will of all the people, can secure to all their 
birthright, without distinction of colour, race, sex or belief’ counted for little (Freedom 
Charter, 1955: 1). Churches were publicly requested to take a clear separational stance from 
the ANC and the Communist Party, for example as the then president of South Africa P.W. 
Botha conveyed in a public letter to Archbishop Tutu on the 16th of March 1988: ‘You are no 
doubt aware that the expressed intention of the planned revolution by the ANC/SACP 
alliance is to ultimately transform South Africa into an atheistic Marxist state, where freedom 
of faith and worship will surely be among the first casualties’ (Journal of Theology for 
Southern Africa, June 1988:72).2 If the media controlled by the NP managed to forge the 
opinion, at home and abroad, that the relationship between religion and the ANC was of a 
dangerous nature, academic literature has not been successful in uncovering the relevance 
and specificities of this collaboration.  
 
The study of public Christianity in Africa went through considerable changes with the end of 
colonialism. In most of the African continent, the 60s ushered in the idea that it was time to 
reinterpret much of the history, including the historical role played by religion in politics. The 
Department of World Mission and Evangelism of the World Council of Churches (WCC) 
meeting in 1962 was fundamental in sparking a new re-interpretative process putting a great 
concern on the idea of ‘building of bridges of mutual understanding and reconciliation’ 
(Pretorius, 1995:185). In 1965 an international congress of African historians held in Dar el 
Salam marked a watershed in African historiography in general and it affected the writing of 
Church history in Africa. One of the main themes identified was that of resistance and 
rebellion against colonial rule and the uncovered work played by religion. At the centre of the 
debate there was the need to understand the workings of the African Church and its 
interaction with society and politics (Ranger, 1968). While this new attitude was pervading a 
large part of the continent, it is possible to identify problems and limitations in the South 
African academic production. As Lonsdale pointed out South African historiography 
remained outside the mainstream: ‘The situation is changing rapidly at the present [in the 
80s], but South African historiography had what was virtually a lost generation in the 1960s, 
the ‘Africanist’ or nationalist historians who elsewhere began to rewrite the history of 
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independent tropical Africa’ (Lonsdale, 1983:70). Without its own end of colonisation, South 
Africa did not reinvent its way of writing history, including religious history, as was 
happening elsewhere on the continent. Until the 80s the study of religion in the country was 
mainly dominated by functionalist approaches that privileged typologies and classification of 
religious phenomena more than the analysis of their action and impact on society and politics. 
The functionalist paradigm persisted until the 80s (Kruss, 1985) when Marxist thinkers 
started to dominate with the insistence that explanations should be founded in social and 
economic circumstances, to the exclusion of culture and religion (Marks & Atmore, 1980). 
Focussing attention on class analysis and political economy, though, the dominant South 
African academic production largely excluded analyses of the public role that religion played 
in Apartheid and post-Apartheid South Africa. Uniquely to the country, this intellectual 
dominant approach persisted until the end of the 20th century, opening spaces for debates and 
investigations on the public role of religion only in very recent times.  
 
The history of how religion shaped politics during and after the Apartheid era, and vice versa 
how politics shaped religion itself, still need to be written in full alongside a history of how 
politics and party dynamics in the post-Apartheid era affecting the way religion manifests in 
the public. As this relationship changed and transformed across decades and through different 
political settlements, from Apartheid to the democratic transition to contemporary post-
Apartheid, this chapter will explore the dynamic relationship between different Christian 
churches and the African National Congress across time. In doing so the chapter will 
highlight the importance of understanding the interconnective and evolving relations between 
religion and party politics in a country in which religion plays a major role in shaping society 
and visions for the future, and where the ruling party, at certain times, had tried to co-opt and 
develop preferential relationships with certain religious groups at the expense of others. 
 
2. From Apartheid to Democracy 
South Africa encompasses Christian denominations from across the spectrum (Elphick & 
Davenport, 1997), and while mainline churches – the so-called churches with European 
missionary origins – have been publicly dominant and more populous until the end of the 20th 
century, in the past decades evangelical churches, especially African Independent Churches 
(AICs) and Pentecostal-charismatics have grown rapidly, a trend that reflects their dynamic 
ascent across the rest of the continent. Christianity, as the main religion in the country (79.8% 
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according to the 2001 national census, last census that included religious affiliation in the 
questionnaire, StatsSA online), has always had a privileged relationship with political parties. 
"We recognise that while there is extensive religious diversity, the majority of South Africans 
are Christians" shouted Jacob Zuma from the altar of a Pentecostal-charismatic church just a 
few days before the presidential elections in 2009 that followed the general elections on April 
22 (Rhema Church Prayer Service, 30 April 2009 cited in West 2010:52).  
This connection between Christianity and politics was particularly clear, for example, during 
the Apartheid era with the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC)3 and the National Party (for an 
analysis of the Dutch Reformed Church and the National Party during the Apartheid era, see 
for example Kuperus, 1999).  Indeed, the National Party, continuously in government 
between 1948 and May 1994,4 found justification in Christian political theology through 
specific readings of Calvinist thought and through the unquestioning support of the DRC. 
The loss of the special connection with the ruling party and the crumbling of Apartheid, left 
this Church silent in the public arena in the 90s, only beginning to reshape its public voice 
around issues of social justice in the middle of the following decade, when it also joined other 
ecumenical bodies, as for example the SACC in 2002 (Kuperus, 2011).  
The ANC, when it was a liberation movement, ran a Department of Religious Affairs in order 
to deal with religious organisations and leaders (African National Congress Records: 1970-
1991.B2.5a Department of Religious Affairs, Historical Papers research archive, the 
University of the Witwatersrand). In 1995, a year after the first democratic elections that 
swept the ANC to power with majority support (62.7% of the total votes), the office was 
formalised with the establishment of ‘The ANC Commission for Religious Affairs' that 
remains based in Luthuli House, the ANC national headquarters in Johannesburg. While the 
ANC founders were influenced by evangelical thinking and the speeches of the first ANC 
president, Rev. John Dube, ‘read as charismatic sermons’ (Balcomb, 2004:6), during the 
Apartheid era the ANC had a preferential relationship with mainline churches, especially 
through the umbrella of the South African Council of Churches, an interdenominational 
forum that unites thirty-six member churches and other Christian organisations across the 
country. This did not preclude the collaboration with individuals or leaders belonging to other 
religions, for example, records can be found of the meeting between ANC leaders in exile 
and the interfaith delegation composed of Christian, Muslims and Hindu participants in 
Lusaka in 1987 (SAHO online B). Nonetheless, it was with the SACC and the churches and 
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organisations it represented, including the Southern African Catholic Bishop Conference 
(SACBC), that the liberation movement developed a programmatic strategy of collaboration 
and seeking public and financial support. Founded in 1968, the SACC became a platform for 
anti-Apartheid activities in the country and internationally through church networks and 
ecumenical organisations, financially and spiritually they supported victims of the regime in 
the country and in exile, they collaborated with the international Anti-Apartheid Movement 
and the boycotts against the Pretoria regime, they led the formulation of the Kairos Document 
(Goba, 1987), the very first theological denunciation of the Apartheid regime as an evil force 
to vanquish, they urged churches in South Africa to distance themselves from the NP and the 
government. Several members of the SACC were, or became later in the post-Apartheid 
context, members of the ANC – for example an ex SACC general, Frank Chikane (1987-
1994), served as Director General (1999-2009) in the office of president Thabo Mbeki. So 
closely was the SACC associated with the ANC that it was often raided by government 
security forces, members of the organisation were often persecuted and detained without trial 
and in September 1988 the headquarters in Johannesburg, Khotso House,5 were destroyed by 
a bombing that was personally ordered by the then South African president P.W. Botha 
because it was considered ‘a secret meeting place for members of the ANC, then a banned 
organisation’ (TRC final report, volume 5, 1998: 225-6 in SAHO online C).  
 
The SACC’s strong connections with the African National Congress during the Apartheid era 
determined its relationship with the ANC-led post-Apartheid government and left the Council 
and other ecumenical organisations largely weaker and in search of a separate identity after 
the first democratic elections in 1994. Indeed, with the ‘historical friends’ taking power, ‘the 
role of SACC and its identity changed enormously and drastically. Churches were not able to 
relate to the new reality. The change is connected to the theology of power of persons who 
were now in charge in Parliament, colleagues and friends’ (author’s interview, Dr Molefe 
Tsele, SACC General Secretary, 30 May 2002). The problem of a close identity with power 
and other factors (such as the reduction in international financial support after the end of 
Apartheid, the growth of evangelical churches and also a considerable movement of well-
educated religious people into well remunerated jobs in politics and business) determined 
what was defined as a period of ‘critical solidarity’ (Bompani, 2006) towards the 
government’s work, that indeed corresponded to a period of relative silence on the part of the 
SACC during the Mandela’s presidency (1994-1999) and the early Mbeki presidency. This 
was also in line with the invitation from Mandela himself to churches to retreat from the 
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public sphere, returning to their denominational space and supporting the nation-building 
process by focusing on the moral reconstruction of the country. In short, an invitation to leave 
politics well alone was expressed in several speeches and through the institution of the 
National Religious Leaders Forum (NRLF), a permanent platform where churches were 
consulted and invited to co-operate with the government and act as moral agents for the new 
democratic dispensation (Bompani, 2006). Given the nature of contemporary South African 
party politics, where the head of the largest party is generally elected President of the 
country, the President of the country also shapes the direction of the ruling party and its 
interaction with governmental and non-governmental bodies. In this line, with Mandela we 
can observe a honeymoon period of ‘critical solidarity’ in which churches retreated from the 
political sphere. Under Thabo Mbeki churches started to adopt a slightly more critical tone 
and to reform around ecumenical organisations in relation to issues of service delivery, 
xenophobia, the neighbouring Zimbabwe crisis and most of all the Anti-Retroviral Campaign 
(ARC) and Mbeki’s peculiar policies towards HIV/AIDS in the country (author’s interview 
with Rev. Eddy Makue, SACC General Secretary, 8 June 2010. For more information, for 
example, see Bompani, 2012). This re-entrance into politics was not comparable, though, to 
the anti-government effort during the anti-apartheid struggle, but can be interpreted as a 
‘critical engagement’ and collaboration with other civil society organisations in publicly 
questioning the ANC’s impact and the President’s work. This second phase in the post-
Apartheid era corresponded with the ANC’s attempt to recompose the ranks and old alliance 
with the SACC while regularly reminding them, through the voice of President Mbeki, that 
criticizing the operate of the ANC, was like abandoning ‘the common struggle against the 
legacy of apartheid.’ (Mail and Guardian, 2 November 2001 cited in Bompani, 2006: 1142). 
As with Mandela, Mbeki expected that the ANC’s old allies would remain supportive of the 
government’s mandate, distance themselves from politics and focus on issues of morality and 
spirituality. It is only with the Zuma Presidency that this expectation of a neat separation 
between the moral and the political sphere from churches fully crumbled and religious 
voices, mainline churches but also evangelicals, found a new strong political public voice in 
the post-Apartheid era and that the SACC reinvented its prophetic mission6, as the next 





3. The Zuma era and the search for new allies  
 
Under the Zuma presidency between May 2009 and his resignation in February 2018, it is 
possible to observe a shift in the way the ANC engaged with religion in the public sphere. 
Throughout his presidency, and before then during the run-up to becoming the head of his 
party in 2007, Zuma made several appearances in selected evangelical churches (Ward, 
2010), and encouraged the public support of religious leaders in relation to his court cases 
(for his ongoing sixteen charges of corruption, fraud and racketeering in total, SABC News, 4 
June 2018).  He also famously made statements such as for example ‘When you vote for the 
ANC, you are also choosing to go to heaven’ (Mail&Guardian online, 7 February 2011) or 
‘the ANC will rule until Jesus comes’ (Mail&Guardian online, 5 July 2016). This generated 
much public debate on the unprecedented lack of neutrality and secularity demonstrated by 
an elected head of state in the democratic dispensation. This shift towards religion not only 
altered political dynamics in the South African post-Apartheid context, but also reshaped 
long-standing alliances with religious actors. Indeed, if the ANC’s historical allies since the 
struggle against Apartheid have been mainline churches, with Zuma we can observe a clear 
alignment with Pentecostal-charismatic churches and African Independent Churches (AICs); 
religious groups that, for different reasons, until recently have remained quite distant from 
party politics.  
 
The now vibrant evangelical charismatic movement, previously political aloof, has started to 
emerge as a political force and to define its position within the South African political 
establishment (Kuperus, 2011:284). Although, as Anthony Balcomb (2004) demonstrated, the 
evangelical charismatic movement is complex and encompasses different political positions; 
amongst this umbrella several Pentecostal-charismatic churches clearly emerged as ANC 
supporters under the Zuma leadership. No longer a minority in the country and with the urge 
to influence political leaders (Frahm-Arp, 2015 uses the term charismatic ‘chaplains’ in 
relation to those ones in the highest offices of government) in order to promote their values, 
some of which are opposition to some of the liberal and progressive South African 
Constitution, Pentecostal-charismatics found a way to express their voice during the Zuma 
presidency through the newly formed inter-faith structures and the nascent alliance with the 
president: 
Our church has taken the view that leadership is required among politicians and 
business people, to provide a moral and spiritual, or prophetic voice, that calls for 
integrity, justice, fairness and accountability. We see this was a calling we have as a 
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Church to engage the leaders of our society. It is for this reason that we have 
participated in ecumenical and inter-Church forums and structures (author’s interview 
with Marius Oosthuizen, Rhema Bible Church, 25 September 2018). 
 
AICs, although evangelical in their theology, constitute a separate reality from Pentecostal-
charismatic churches in the country but they equally found a way to push through into the 
public scene. In the post-Apartheid period between, or at least from 1994 until the Mbeki era, 
there have been a few attempts from the government to involve AICs in the ‘moral 
reconstruction’ of the country, to echo the call started by president Mandela towards South 
African religious groups but only answered by a few individual AICs leaders (author’s 
interview with Archbishop Ngada, African Spiritual Churches Association, 08 March 2002). 
 
Although some cooperative links were created with individual AICs, the general sense from 
the within these religious communities was that there were still fractures in need of healing 
between AICs and the ANC given that the ANC did not understand or recognise their work 
during the liberation struggle (Bompani, 2010). AICs have not acted politically in South 
Africa as they have elsewhere in the continent. For example, AICs in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (Kimbanguism) and in the Ivory Coast (Harrist Church) have supported 
political movements; while in South Africa AICs tend to stay away from national public 
discussions and debates. Reverend Cedric Mayson in 2001, then Head of the ANC 
Commission for Religious Affairs, pointed out that in the post-apartheid there have been 
various attempts by the ANC to collaborate with AICs, adding that in the case of independent 
churches traditionally their contacts were with people and not with institutions:  
 
These are fragmented churches. It is difficult to reach them also because they are 
in rural areas or in deprived urban areas, like informal settlements. The main 
problem when you talk of accessibility to AICs, is that these organisation are 
literally independent from everything, not just from mainline churches, but even 
from the government and political organisations (author’s interview with Rev. 
Cedric Mayson, ANC Religious Commission Affairs, 30 October 2001). 
 
He also stated that transformation in South Africa coincides with the proliferation of a new 
spirituality that needed to be recognised and taken into account by the political establishment: 
‘We are aware of that and we, as the ruling party chosen by the majority of the population, 
have to consider this renovated need for religion and religious values, mainly Christian’ 
(author’s interview with Rev. Cedric Mayson, ANC Commission Affairs for Religious 
Affairs, 30 October 2001). It consistently emerged from several interviews with government 
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bodies and ecumenical organisations (author’s fieldwork between 1999 and 2018) that AICs 
have always been considered as diverse, fragmented and ‘uneasy’ actors, difficult to involve 
in public debates and action for social transformation. In contrast, the political strategy of 
Zuma, with a mix of ‘rational populism’ and pragmatism (Marais, 2010), invoking 
‘Africaness’ and national identity, provided a new public platform for those churches that 
similarly pose importance to tradition and African culture (Bompani, 2008). 
 
Zuma’s attitude and search for new alliances marked a change not only in terms of the kinds 
of religious actors that occupy the public sphere but also in the way the ruling party actively 
shaped and initiated the creation of new religious bodies in seeking religious and moral 
support for its mandate. Indeed, Zuma’s ascent to power had withstood a long succession of 
ethical and legal issues, from the rape trial in 2005 to the corruption case around the South 
African Arms Deal in 1999 (Gumede, 2008), which motivated the newly elected president to 
look for a way of demonstrating his own and his party’s moral. Similarly to other African 
contexts (for example in Uganda, Bompani 2018; in Kenya, Deacon 2015; and in Nigeria, 
Obadare, 2018) but also to the U.S. (Gorski, 2019), Zuma turned to the growing variegated 
group of Pentecostal-charismatic churches in the country to find moral and spiritual support. 
As a polygamist involved in multiple charges of corruption coupled with their history of 
collaboration with the Mandela and Mbeki factions of the ANC (Pillay, 2017), Zuma could 
not find public support from the mainline churches united as they were under the umbrella of 
the SACC and of the SACBC. Zuma’s rise to power determined a shift from the placid public 
role of those bodies. From the period of ‘critical solidarity’ and ‘critical engagement’ 
discussed above, they shifted to becoming active critical voices of the government once 
again, this time a government ran by their historical allies. From press statements, to 
campaigns and public protests, to sermons and news interviews against corruption and the 
malfunctioning of the state in delivering services, Zuma in some ways managed to reignite 
the political nature of those bodies. In 2012 the SACC held a conference to redefine and 
renew its mission as a critical public voice in South Africa where the fight against corruption 
and poor state performance were articulated as priorities (author’s interview with Bishop 
Malusi Mpumlwana, SACC General Secretary, 31 August 2018, Johannesburg). ‘We have 
come to recognise that South Africa may just be a few inches from the throes of a mafia state 
from which there may be no return, a recipe for a failed state’ said the SACC General 
Secretary Bishop Mpumlwana in a press release in May 2017 while talking of the cases of 
corruption related to Zuma and the Gupta family (Reuters online, 23 May 2017).  
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When president Zuma felt that the ANC were losing support from mainline churches, and 
their ecumenical bodies, he turned to other denominations for public support. It is in light of 
this shift that the institution of the National Interfaith Leadership Council (NILC) can be 
explained. In 2009 Pastor Ray McCauley of Rhema Bible Church and Dr Mathole 
Motshekga, head of ANC Religious Affairs Commission and ANC chief whip at the time, 
formed a new interfaith organization called the National Interfaith Leadership Council 
(NILC). This network was defined as ‘a mass-based interreligious group intended to partner 
with the government in terms of improving service delivery regarding the provision of basic 
services like water, electricity and housing’ (Kuperus, 2011:291) and saluted by Zuma as 
‘The holy revolution of the people of God against corruption, moral degeneration and the 
invisibility and marginalisation of previously disadvantaged people and communities’ (ref.  
More orientated towards AICs and Pentecostal-charismatic groups, the NILC has been 
perceived as a substitute for the (more critical) South African Council of Churches. This was 
confirmed by the fact that SACC was not invited to the launch of the new organisation in 
August 2009 (author’s interview with Rev. Eddy Makue, SACC General Secretary, 8 June 
2010). Although they never publicly identified themselves as having a preferential link to the 
ANC, many NILC members were ANC MPs, no member was associated with other political 
parties and the organisation relied on the ANC parliamentary caucus’s communication 
facilities for their external communication and most of all they displayed an extremely strong 
support to Zuma (Mail&Guardian online, 11 September 2009).  
NILC had that special relation with the ANC and we do not want to have any kind of 
similar relation with political organisations. We want to protect jealously our 
autonomy and independence; we believe that it is the president prerogative to 
establish agencies that he respects; but we are worried that if every president has to 
choose the religious leaders that he wants, it will further weaken religious 
communities in South Africa (author’s interview with Rev. Eddy Makue, SACC 
General Secretary, 8 June 2010). 
The NRLF subsequently merged with the existing National Religious Leaders Forum (NRLF) 
instituted by Mandela to form the National Interfaith Council of South Africa (NICSA) in 
2011. This did not happen without contestation from many non-aligned religious leaders that 
felt that the original broad umbrella became co-opted by the government and was excluding 
religious voices that were not in line with the president.  
In February 2016 we arranged a meeting with ANC representatives to discuss 
corruption and other urgent matters for the country. The meeting took place at Oliver 
Tambo airport. There was a delegation of five bishops, including the SACBC General 
Secretary and myself from Justice and Peace. When we arrived, we were surprised to 
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find out that instead of ANC delegates, we were welcomed by members of NICSA. 
Their agenda was to persuade the SACBC to join the platform (author’s interview 
with Father Stan Muyebe, Justice and Peace, Southern African Catholic Bishop 
Conference, 30 August 2018).  
NICSA maintained clear support to Zuma throughout his presidency and beyond, battling 
against other critical political and religious voices. Criticising the National Persecuting 
Authority, Bishop Bheki Ngcobo from NICSA, for example, publicly said: ‘Some like the 
South African Council of Churches have found Zuma guilty before he appeared in court. We 
cannot tolerate being ruled by the SACC. They are nothing to us indigenous churches here in 
South Africa. We are not looking for anything from them. They can go to hell’ (IOLNews 
online, 15 April 2018).  
Although there have been several public attempts, initiated both by the Presidential Office 
and by religious leaders, to reconcile churches and interfaith bodies (interviews with 
representatives of the SACC and SACBC, 2010-2018), and there has been a constant 
reclamation of political independence by those bodies, churches’ deployment in support or 
against Zuma opened up a new form of divisiveness within public Christianity in South 
Africa and determined the emergence of new political strategies and alignments across 
churches. This fragmentation also reflects divisions within the same ruling party that 
struggles to grapple with fringes still supportive of Zuma’s populist style and critical of the 
so-called neoliberal, moderate style of other ANC leaders.  When President Ramaphosa took 
power in February 2018, he was saluted by many as a politician respectful of the separation 
between religion and politics. ‘President Ramaphosa is a participative leader who has a 
history of consultation with multiple stakeholders, across the social and political sphere. As 
such, we expect the president will want to work with the Churches, while respecting their 
autonomy (author’s interview with Marius Oosthuizen, Rhema Bible Church, 25 September 
2018). De facto, in marked contrast to his predecessor, Ramaphosa remained silent on 
religious matters and did not consult publicly with churches during his initial mandate 
(author’s interview with Bishop Malusi Mpumlwana, SACC General Secretary, 31 August 
2018). Although it is quite early days to provide a serious analysis of the relationship 
between the ANC and religion under Ramaphosa’s leadership, it appears that one of the 
major challenges posed to him in the upcoming national elections in June 2019 is the issue of 
fragmentation within the party and across their religious and secular allies. His quiet strategy 
and cautious approach towards old and new religious allies may be dictated by the need to 
heal and mend divisions created by Zuma and to gain the broadest support across the 
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electoral spectrum. After all, political leaders cannot ignore the power of the reservoir of the 




From this analysis of the shifting relationships between the ANC and public Christianity 
across several decades it is possible to draw at least three distinct conclusions. Firstly, 
religion in South Africa has been and continues to be relevant in the public realm, but its 
interaction with politics is dynamic, changes and evolves. Similarly, the religious subjects 
that become more politically active and visible alternate along the construction of new 
alliances to the detriment of older ones. Evangelical Christianity, in the case of South Africa 
especially in the form of Pentecostal-charismatic churches and African Independent churches, 
remained distant from politics and public engagement with political parties and political 
movements during Apartheid and in the first democratic era. However, in the past decade it is 
possible to observe from these churches the building up of a political theology and practical 
involvement in the running of the State (for an analysis of the motivations beyond this 
political ascent, see for example Burchardt, 2017).While across the evangelical spectrum 
churches differ quite considerably in terms of organisation, priorities and theology, they all 
appear to emerge as political actors in ways that are new and different from the past. This is 
in sharp contrast with earlier analyses of African Pentecostalism as distant from democratic 
contributions and as apolitical in nature (from example, see Corten & Marshall-Fratani, 2001 
and Gifford, 1998). As per other African contexts, South African political leaders found in 
these denominations alternative allies from mainline churches.  
 
Secondly, mainline churches after the huge effort of participating into the democratisation 
process of several African countries in the 90s (Gifford,1995) and challenged by the growth 
of evangelical Christianity have struggled to redefine a clear political theology of action in 
more recent times. An honourable exception being the extremely active Catholic Church in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) during the building-up and running of the national 
elections in December 2019. However, this may be determined by the fact that the DRC 
Catholic Church still represents almost half of the population (Pew Forum, 2016), is without 
a real challenge to its membership posed by the rise of evangelical Christianity, and that its 
networks and organisational apparatus is unique in the vast and badly connected country.The 
South African case, through the South African Council of Churches, also demonstrates how 
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alliances shaped in pre-democratic contexts through liberation movements may affect the 
way in which religious subjects feel constrained to challenge old allies in the new democratic 
dispensation. For the SACC, it took more than two decades to begin to reformulate a critical 
active voice apart from the government.  
 
Thirdly, this chapter highlights new distinct forms of contrast and division in political 
theologies and in the everyday between mainline churches oriented more towards 
progressive, liberal stances of social justice and equality and charismatic churches exhibiting 
more traditional and conservative values and objectives such as for example the fight against 
‘amoral’ modern world that disrupts old and ‘ethical’ ideas of family and gender divisions in 
South Africa (Burchardt, 2018). Even if constitutionally South Africa is a secular country, 
Christians remain an important political reservoir and leaders try to tap into them. The 
pragmatic and strategic intervention of Zuma in his search of new religious allies, ratcheted 
up this religious division that is now visible and ritualised in public action and public 
statements. This demonstrates how politics and political leaders can be effective in shaping 
religious public action and in privileging certain religious subjects over others in order to 
gain public support. This emerging clash between different denominations is quite new in 
South Africa where interfaith and multi-denominational fora have traditionally been 
dominant and faith-interaction has been quite fluid. It will be interesting to observe in future 
years whether this division was merely the product of Zuma’s strategic intervention, or if 
deeper unreconcilable theological stances and political interpretations will forge ever broader 
separations between those two religious blocks. 
  
If we engage with recent literature on the public role of Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
we can observe many similarities between South Africa and other African countries. Tracing 
these parallels can be used, alongside other academic work, to vanquish the ‘exceptionalism’ 
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